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Abstract. The so-called great divergence in the income per capita is described in the 
Unified Growth Theory as the mind-boggling and unresolved mystery about the growth 
process. This mystery has now been solved: the great divergence never happened. It was 
created by the manipulation of data. Economic growth in various regions is at different 
levels of development but it follows similar, non-divergent trajectories. Unified Growth 
Theory is shown yet again to be incorrect and scientifically unacceptable. It promotes 
incorrect and even potentially dangerous concepts. The distorted presentation of data 
supporting the concept of the great divergence shows that economic growth is now 
developing along moderately-increasing trajectories but mathematical analysis of the same 
data and even their undistorted presentation shows that these trajectories are now increasing 
approximately vertically with time. So, while the distorted presentation of data used in the 
Unified Growth Theory suggests generally sustainable and secure economic growth, the 
undistorted presentation of data demonstrates that the growth is unsustainable and insecure. 
The concept of takeoffs from stagnation to the sustained-growth regime promoted in the 
Unified Growth Theory is also dangerously misleading because it suggests a sustainable 
and prosperous future while the mathematical analysis of data shows that the current 
economic growth is insecure and unsustainable. 
 
Introduction  
Those who are less familiar with the scientific process of investigation might not 
be aware that there is also unscientific approach, which unfortunately appears to be 
used sometimes even in academic circles. It is important to have a clear 
understanding of these two different ways of investigation in order to be able to 
distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable claims and conclusions. 
In science, theories are tested by data. In unscientific discussions, data are tested by 
theories. In unscientific presentations, selective use of data is common. Data are 
manipulated, distorted or rejected if they do not agree with preconceived ideas.  
In the scientific research, contradicting evidence is not only accepted but looked 
for because it usually leads to new discoveries. In unscientific discussions, 
contradicting evidence is studiously rejected because it threatens the established 
knowledge.  
In science, data are rigorously analysed. In non-scientific discussions, rigorous 
analysis is avoided and interpretations of data are based on impressions, but 
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impressions can be misleading. The Sun appears to be circling around the Earth but 
it is not. Logical explanations are not necessarily reliable. 
It is also important to understand the limitations of mathematics. Elaborate stories 
and explanations can be translated into mathematical language but such translations 
are meaningless unless they can be tested by data.  
We should never be mesmerised by complicated mathematical formulae and 
presentations. The essential question is whether the presented mathematics can be 
tested by relevant data. If stories translated into mathematics cannot be tested (or 
are not tested) by data, if they have to be accepted by faith, then obviously they 
have no scientific value and they can be (or even should be) rejected. Mathematical 
formulations should be making testable predictions. A story dressed up in a 
mathematical gown will be just a story unless it makes a testable prediction.  
A good example of the unscientific approach to research is the Unified Growth 
Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011). Data are manipulated and distorted. Selected data, 
which appear to support preconceived concepts, are repeatedly quoted. Excellent 
data of Maddison (2001) are used during the formulation of this theory but they are 
never analysed. They are presented in distorted ways to support the preconceived 
ideas. Galor translates his assumed and scientifically-unsupported interpretations of 
economic growth into many complicated but rather primitive mathematical 
formulae.  However, he does not make even a single mathematical prediction, 
which can be tested directly by data. His mathematical expressions do not describe 
growth trajectories that could be compared with data he uses during the 
formulation of his theory.  
His concepts can be only tested indirectly by showing that within the range of the 
mathematically-analysable data there was no stagnation, no sudden takeoffs, no 
“remarkable” or “stunning” escapes from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 
177, 220) and no transition from stagnation to the so called sustained growth 
regime (Nielsen, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f, 2016g, 
2015h). Economic growth in the past was sustainable and secure, as indicated by 
the steadily-increasing hyperbolic trajectories, but now it is unsustainable and 
insecure (Nielsen, 2015b). The numerous mathematical formulae used in the 
Unified Growth Theory do not describe or explain the historical economic growth 
because they incorporate concepts, which are either contradicted repeatedly by data 
or have to be accepted by faith.  
We have already demonstrated (Nielsen, 2014, 2015a, 2016a, 2016b, 2016d, 
2016e, 2016f, 2016g, 2016h) that Galor’s Unified Growth Theory is fundamentally 
incorrect because it is based on fundamentally-incorrect ideas. We have shown that 
within the range of the mathematically-analysable data, historical economic growth 
and the growth of population were hyperbolic. For the economic growth, the range 
of evidence is limited but for the growth of human population it can be extended to 
10,000 BC (Nielsen, 2016b). We have demonstrated that within the range of 
analysable data, there was no Malthusian stagnation and no Malthusian trap. The 
growth was slow over a long time but it was steadily increasing and there was no 
transition at any time in the past that could be described as a sudden takeoff, spurt, 
sprint or explosion. We have demonstrated that Galor’s claim of sudden takeoffs is 
repeatedly contradicted by data. There were no takeoffs and consequently there 
was also no differential timing of takeoffs. During the time of claimed takeoffs, 
economic growth and the growth of population were continuing to increase along 
undisturbed and remarkably stable hyperbolic trajectories until recently, when they 
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started to be diverted to slower but still fast-increasing trajectories. This conclusion 
applies not only to the growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
population but also to the growth of income per capita (GDP/cap). We do not have 
to try to explain the mechanism of the epoch of Malthusian stagnation and of the 
escape from the Malthusian trap because there was no stagnation and no trap. What 
we have to explain is why the growth in the past was hyperbolic, why it was so 
remarkably stable and why it started to be diverted recently to new, non-hyperbolic 
trajectories. 
 
The concept of the great divergence 
The concept of the great divergence belongs to a set of other phantom “mysteries 
about the growth process” (Galor, 2005a, p. 220) invented by Galor and reinforced 
by the habitually distorted presentations of data (Ashraf, 2009; Galor, 2005a, 
2005b, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Galor and 
Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008). One example of the distorted presentation 
of data used routinely by Galor is shown in Figure 1. In contrast, the accurate 
presentation of precisely the same data, together with their mathematical analysis, 
is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 1. Example of the ubiquitous, grossly-distorted and self-misleading diagrams used 
to create the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011). Maddison’s data (Maddison, 
2001) were used during the formulation of this theory but they were never analysed. Such 
state-of-the-art was used to construct a system of scientifically-unsupported interpretations, 
explanations and “mysteries of the growth process” (Galor, 2005a, p. 220). 
 
In the distorted and appropriately manipulated presentation of data shown in Figure 
1 we can see clearly the non-monotonic growth of population and of the GDP/cap. 
After the apparent long stagnation, we see a sudden takeoff to a new regime of 
growth. Galor made no attempt to analyse data, which is surprising because their 
analysis is trivially simple (Nielsen, 2014). The manipulated data appear to support 
the concept of stagnation and takeoffs described usually as the escape from the 
Malthusian trap. 
In contrast, the accurate display of precisely the same data suggests entirely 
different interpretation. General features presented in Figure 1 are still maintained 
but now mathematical analysis of these data shows that the GDP/cap and the size of 
the population were increasing monotonically (Nielsen, 2014, 2015a, 2016a, 2016d, 
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2016g). There were no sudden takeoffs from stagnation to growth because there 
was no stagnation and because the acceleration was gradual along the entire range 
of these distributions. The gradient and the growth rate of the GDP/cap distribution 
were changing monotonically without any discontinuity, which could be claimed as 
a takeoff (Nielsen, 2015a). 
 
Figure 2. The same data (Maddison, 2001) as used in Figure 1but now displayed accurately 
and analysed. They follow monotonically-increasing distributions, which cannot be divided 
into distinctively-different components (Nielsen, 2014, 2015a, 2016a, 2016d, 2016g). 
 
Even though the GDP/cap distribution seems to suggest a sudden increase, this 
feature is just an illusion, which is dispelled by the mathematical analysis of data or 
even by simply using semilogarithmic scales of reference (Nielsen, 2015a, 2016g). 
The GDP/cap is the ratio of two distributions, the distribution describing the growth 
of the GDP and the distribution describing the growth of population. Both were 
increasing hyperbolically and monotonically (Nielsen, 2015a, 2016a, 2016d). The 
displayed features (slow growth over a long time and fast growth over a short time) 
represent nothing more than mathematical properties of monotonically-increasing 
hyperbolic distributions. They are not the unique properties of economic growth but 
economic growth happens to be hyperbolic. 
It is impossible to locate a transition from the slow to fast growth for hyperbolic 
distributions (Nielsen, 2014) because such a transition does not exist. The GDP/cap 
distributions are simply the linearly-modulated and monotonically-increasing 
hyperbolic distributions (Nielsen, 2015a).  
The distorted diagram used by Galor to support his erroneous concept of the great 
divergence is presented in Figure 3.  This distorted presentation of Maddison’s data 
was reproduced from Galor’s publication (Galor, 2005a, p. 175). It shows that over 
a long time there was hardly any difference in the economic growth for various 
regions. However, from around the time of the Industrial Revolution, 1760-1840 
(Floud & McCloskey, 1994), there was a sudden takeoff and the economic growth 
diverged into distinctly different trajectories.  
We have already demonstrated that there were no takeoffs in the growth of the 
GDP and GDP/cap (Nielsen, 2015a, 2016e, 2016g) and consequently there was 
also no differential timing of takeoffs claimed by Galor in his Unified Growth 
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Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011). We have also demonstrated that there were no 
takeoffs in the growth of human population in the past 12,000 years (Nielsen, 
2016b, 2016d). The incorrectly-claimed takeoffs represent just the natural 
continuations of hyperbolic growth. Analysis of data shows that at the time of the 
alleged takeoffs and in clear contradiction of the Unified Growth Theory, economic 
growth in various regions was either continuing to increase along undisturbed 
hyperbolic trajectories or started to be diverted to slower trajectories. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. A typical distorted presentation of Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001) used by 
Galor to support his concepts of takeoffs and of the great divergence (Galor, 2005a, p. 175). 
 
Now we shall show that there was no great divergence in income per capita. We 
shall show again that the Unified Growth Theory is scientifically unacceptable. It 
does not describe the mechanism of economic growth. It describes phantom 
features constructed by the manipulation of data.  
We shall show that the great divergence never happened. However, we shall also 
explain how Galor constructed his great divergence.   We shall show how the great 
divergence can be constructed by a distorted presentation of any distributions, 
which increase slowly over a long time and fast over a short time. They do not 
have to be distributions describing economic growth.  
 
The early data of Maddison 
We shall first investigate precisely the same data (Maddison, 2001) as used by 
Galor (2005a, 2011) during the formulation of his Unified Growth Theory and we 
shall show that they do not support the concept of the great divergence. Results of 
mathematical analysis of these data are shown in Figures 4-9. Parameters of the 
fitted distributions have been listed earlier (Nielsen, 2016g). The fitted curves are 
the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distributions (Nielsen, 2015a) obtained by 
dividing hyperbolic distributions fitting the corresponding GDP and population 
data (Nielsen, 2016a, 2016d). All GDP/cap values are in 1990 International Geary-
Khamis dollars. 
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Figure 4. Growth of income per capita, i.e. Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP/cap), 
in Western Europe (Maddison, 2001; Nielsen, 2016g). From around 1913, economic growth 
in Western Europe started to depart from the historical linearly-modulated hyperbolic 
distribution. However, it continued to increase close to the historically-predicted trajectory. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Growth of income per capita in Eastern Europe (Maddison, 2001; Nielsen, 
2016g). From around 1870, economic growth in Eastern Europe started to depart from the 
historical linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution. However, it continued to increase 
close to the historically-predicted trajectory. The growth was not diverted to a distinctly 
different and gently-increasing trajectory as claimed by Galor (2005a, 2011; cf Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
Figure 6. Growth of income per capita in countries of the former USSR (Maddison, 2001; 
Nielsen, 2016g). From around 1870, economic growth in the former USSR started to depart 
from the historical linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution. However, it continued to 
increase close to the historically-predicted trajectory. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Growth of income per capita in Asia (Maddison, 2001; Nielsen, 2016g). The data 
follow closely the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution. There was no divergence to a 
distinctly different and gently-increasing trajectory as claimed by Galor (2005a, 2011; cf 
Figure 3). 
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Figure 8. Growth of income per capita in Africa (Maddison, 2001; Nielsen, 2016g). The 
data follow closely the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distributions. There was no 
divergence to a distinctly different and gently-increasing trajectory as claimed by Galor 
(2005a, 2011; cf Figure 3). 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Growth of income per capita in Latin America (Maddison, 2001; Nielsen, 2016g). 
From around 1913, economic growth in Latin America started to depart from the historical 
linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution. However, it continued to increase close to the 
historically-predicted trajectory. The growth was not diverted to a distinctly different and 
gently-increasing trajectory as claimed by Galor (2005a, 2011, cf Figure 3). 
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Figure 10. Growth of income per capita in all regions, including Western offshoots 
(Maddison, 2001). They are all increasing in approximately the same direction. There is no 
divergence to distinctly different trajectories.  
 
The data for Western Offshoots were not analysed because of their poor quality, 
but they are displayed in Figure 10. Their economic growth is similar to the growth 
in Western Europe in the sense that they are clearly ahead of other regions. 
However, distributions presented in Figures 4-9 show that economic growth in all 
regions follows similar trajectories. The difference between regions is not in their 
divergence to distinctly different trajectories as claimed incorrectly by Galor but in 
their levels of economic development.    
Distributions presented in Figures 4-9 are clearly different than the distorted 
distributions constructed by Galor and presented in Figure 3. In Galor’s distorted 
presentation of data there is a cluster of regions (Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and 
Latin America) whose economic growth follows distinctly different trajectories 
than the growth in Western Europe. This information is incorrect because the 
analysis of precisely the same data shows clearly that all distributions are similar, 
including the distribution representing the economic growth in Africa. They are all 
following similar trajectories with a common tendency to increase nearly vertically 
and close to the historical linearly-modulated hyperbolic trajectories.   
The common characteristic feature of all these empirical distributions shown in 
Figures 4-9 is that they have changed gradually from being nearly horizontal to 
nearly vertical. We shall show later that when such distributions become nearly 
vertical it is easy to distort them and construct the great divergence, and it does not 
matter whether they follow the fitted linearly-modulated hyperbolic distributions or 
not.  
The contrast between Maddison’s data and their distorted image constructed by 
Galor is particularly clear if we compare Figure 3 with Figure 8. In Figure 3, the 
data for Africa follow a gently-increasing trajectory after around 1800, i.e. a 
trajectory characterised by a small gradient. The correct display of the same data 
presented in Figure 8 shows diametrically opposite features: the data for Africa 
follow a steep trajectory, i.e. the trajectory characterised by a large gradient. This 
trajectory is approximately vertical.  
In Galor’s distorted presentation of data the trajectory for Africa after around 1800 
is distinctly different than the trajectory for Western Europe. However, precisely 
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the same data displayed in Figures 4 and 8 demonstrate that the trajectories for 
Africa and Western Europe are similar. The only difference is that Africa is further 
behind in its level of development.  
In Galor’s distorted presentation of data, economic growth in Eastern Europe, Asia 
and Latin America follows also gently increasing trajectories after around 1800, 
similar to the trajectory for Africa. However, precisely the same data displayed 
properly in Figures 5, 7, 8 and 9 show that they all follow approximately vertical 
trajectories in much the same way as the data for Western Europe. The only 
difference is again that Western Europe is further ahead but it is further ahead on 
the virtually the same trajectory.  
With such distorted presentation of data it is not surprising that Galor discovered so 
many “mind-boggling” and “perplexing” “mysteries of the growth process” (Galor, 
2005a, pp. 177, 220), mysteries representing phantom features created by the 
manipulation of data.  
In contrast with his distorted presentation of data, the gradient of all empirical 
trajectories in this section of time is large. They all increase nearly vertically. We 
should remember that these trajectories do not describe the economic growth 
represented by the GDP but the GDP per capita. Such a growth cannot be 
explained by the growth of human population. It reflects our surprisingly fast-
increasing demands, which propel economic growth along unsustainable 
trajectories. 
Galor’s theory conveys dangerously incorrect information. According to his 
distorted presentation of data shown in Figure 3, income per capita in certain 
regions (Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America) is following gently 
increasing trajectories after around 1800. Such trajectories are relatively safe. 
However, the correct presentation of precisely the same data shows that in all 
regions income per capita is following fast-increasing trajectories. The data show 
that there is now a critical urgency to regulate economic growth but Galor’s theory 
suggests that there is no danger. 
 
The latest data of Maddison 
Data published by Maddison in 2010 show even more clearly that there was no 
divergence in the economic growth. These data were available to Galor before the 
publications of his book (Galor, 2011) but unfortunately they were not analysed. 
Had Galor analysed these data he would have soon discovered many interesting 
features characterising economic growth, features, which are repeatedly in 
contradiction with his Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011).   
Results of analysis of these new data (Maddison, 2010) are shown in Figures 11-
16. Their combined display is presented in Figure 17.  
Galor’s “mind-boggling” and “perplexing phenomenon of the Great Divergence” 
(Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) has now been solved – there is no mystery. This 
mystery and all other of his mysteries were created by the manipulation of data. In 
Galor’s publications (Galor, 2005b, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2010, 2012a, 
2012b, 2012c; Galor and Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008) data are 
repeatedly manipulated and presented using distorted diagrams.  
The common characteristic feature of Maddison’s data describing the growth of 
income per capita (Maddison, 2001, 2010) in various regions is again that their 
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nearly horizontal trajectories changed gradually into nearly vertical trajectories. 
They have never diverged into distinctly different trajectories as claimed by Galor 
(see Figure 3). Even when the economic growth started to be diverted to slower 
trajectories it continued to increase close to the historical, fast-increasing, linearly-
modulated hyperbolic trajectories.   
 
Figure 11. Growth of income per capita in Western Europe (Maddison, 2010; Nielsen, 
2016g). Between 1900 and 1913, economic growth in Western Europe started to depart 
from the historical linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution. However, it continues to 
increase close to the historically-predicted trajectory. 
 
Figure 12. Growth of income per capita in Eastern Europe (Maddison, 2010; Nielsen, 
2016g). From around 1850 economic growth in Eastern Europe started to depart from the 
historical linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution. However, it continues to increase 
close to the historically-predicted trajectory. The growth was not diverted to a distinctly 
different and gently-increasing trajectory as claimed by Galor (2005a, 2011; cf Figure 3). 
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Figure 13. Growth of income per capita in countries of the former USSR (Maddison, 2010; 
Nielsen, 2016g). Close to around 1870 economic growth in countries of the former USSR 
started to depart from the historical linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution. However, it 
continues to increase close to the historically-predicted trajectory. 
  
 
 
Figure 14. Growth of income per capita in Asia (Maddison, 2010; Nielsen, 2016g). After a 
brief decline between 1940 and 1950, the growth of income per capita in Asia was diverted 
to a slightly faster trajectory. However, it continues to increase close to the historically-
predicted linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution. The growth was not diverted to a 
distinctly different and gently-increasing trajectory as claimed by Galor (2005a, 2011; cf 
Figure 3). 
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Figure 15. Growth of income per capita in Africa (Maddison, 2010; Nielsen, 2016g). In 
clear contradiction of Galor’s claim supported by his distorted presentation of Maddison’s 
data, the growth of income per capita did not diverge to a slowly-increasing trajectory but 
continued to increase along a nearly vertical trend close to the historical linearly-
modulated hyperbolic distribution (cf Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 16. Growth of income per capita in Latin America (Maddison, 2010; Nielsen, 
2016g). In clear contradiction of Galor’s claim supported by his distorted presentation of 
Maddison’s data, growth of income per capita continued to increase along a nearly vertical 
trajectory close to the historical linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution. The growth 
was not diverted to a distinctly different and gently-increasing trajectory as claimed by 
Galor (2005a, 2011; cf Figure 3). 
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Figure 17. Growth of income per capita in all regions, including Western offshoots 
(Maddison, 2010). Even without carrying out mathematical analysis of data it is clear that 
they all follow similar, nearly-vertical trajectories. The “mind-boggling” and “perplexing 
phenomenon of the Great Divergence” (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) has now been 
explained. The great divergence never happened. This mystery, as well as all his other 
“unresolved mysteries about the growth process” (Galor, 2005a, p. 220) has been created 
by the mind-boggling, perplexing and self-misleading manipulation of data. 
 
In Galor’s distorted presentation of data shown in Figure 3, economic growth in 
various regions follows similar trajectories for a long time and then diverges to 
distinctly different trajectories. In the correct and undistorted presentation of data 
shown in Figure 17, economic growth in various regions follows similar 
trajectories all the time. Some regions are slower in their economic development 
but they all race in the same direction and along virtually the same trajectory. They 
do not fan out into distinctly different directions as claimed by Galor. 
We do not have to explain the mechanism of the great divergence because the great 
divergence never happened. It is a feature created by the distorted presentation of 
data. If we want to explain the currently observed differences in the economic 
growth we should not be misguided by the Unified Growth Theory and we should 
not attempt to explain why different regions follow distinctly different trajectories, 
because they do not follow distinctly different trajectories. We should rather try to 
explain why different regions follow similar trajectories and why for some regions 
economic growth is faster while for other regions and it is slower. 
 
Geometric distortions 
We shall now explain how Galor constructed his “unresolved mysteries about the 
growth process” (Galor, 2005a, p. 220): (1) his “mind-boggling” and “perplexing 
phenomenon of the Great Divergence” (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) and (2) his 
takeoffs from the alleged but non-existent stagnation to growth. For this purpose 
we can take any close family of distributions, which change slowly over a large 
range of independent variable and fast over its short range. We can use hyperbolic 
 
 
15 
 
distributions, linearly-modulated hyperbolic distributions, a set of empirical 
distributions such as shown in Figures 10 and 17, or any other hyperbolic-like 
distributions. By their simple manipulation we can easily create Galor’s “mysteries 
about the growth process” (Galor, 2005a, p. 220) but they will not be unresolved 
mysteries. They will not even be mysteries because we shall demonstrate and 
explain their origin. We shall demonstrate that these alleged mysteries do not 
represent unique properties of economic growth but the introduced by us 
disfigurations of hyperbolic-like distributions.  
For our demonstration we have chosen three, closely-related linearly-modulated 
hyperbolic distributions shown in Figure 18. Like the historical income per capita 
distributions, each of these arbitrary distributions is represented by a ratio of two 
hyperbolic distributions. However, they have absolutely nothing to do with 
economic growth. They are purely mathematical functions ( )f x , ( )g x  and ( )h x
where x is an arbitrary independent variable. This variable could be time but it 
could be also anything else. The common feature of these distributions is that they 
start from approximately the same value at 0x  , they increase monotonically 
(they are not characterised by sudden takeoffs at any time) and they increase to 
infinity within a small range of x values. They do not diverge.   
 
 
 
Figure 18. Three arbitrarily-chosen, linearly-modulated, hyperbolic distributions,
( )f x , ( )g x  and ( )h x . They increase monotonically from approximately the same 
value at 0x  to infinity within approximately the same time. 
 
However, if we follow Galor’s example we can use these non-divergent and 
monotonically-increasing distributions and construct a new set of distributions, 
which will be diverging and which will be characterised by clear takeoffs. All we 
have to do is to select a few strategically-located points at certain constant x-values 
and join them by straight lines. This is precisely what Galor was doing repeatedly 
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during the formulation of his Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011) and in 
his other publications (Galor, 2005b, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2010, 2012a, 
2012b, 2012c; Galor and Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008). 
We have selected three values of independent variable, 0x  ,  150x   and  
179.6x  , and by following Galor’s example, we have connected the 
corresponding values of  ( )f x , ( )g x  and ( )h x by straight lines. We have now 
constructed typical distributions used by Galor to formulate his Unified Growth 
Theory. We have also constructed the great divergence and the takeoffs. Results 
are shown in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19. This figure explains how the “mind-boggling” and “perplexing 
phenomenon of the Great Divergence” (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) was invented 
by Galor and how he created his otherwise non-existent takeoffs from the non-
existent stagnation to growth. By following his approach to research, the 
corresponding values of the purely-mathematical functions ( )f x , ( )g x  and ( )h x at 
0x  ,  150x   and  179.6x  were joined by straight lines. The monotonically-
increasing distributions are now replaced by distorted diagrams in much the same 
way as Maddison’s data were replaced by Galor by his distorted diagrams. We 
have constructed the meaningless “mind-boggling” and “perplexing phenomenon 
of the Great Divergence” (Galor, 2005a,pp. 177, 220) preceded by the equally 
meaningless takeoffs at 150x  .  
 
It would be incorrect to claim that our constructed distributions shown in Figure 19 
represent the original distributions but Galor repeatedly and incorrectly uses his 
distorted diagrams as representing Maddison’s data. His repeatedly used diagrams 
are the misrepresentations of data and his conclusions based on such diagrams or 
on quoting some isolated numbers selected from hyperbolic distributions are 
scientifically unacceptable and strongly misleading. 
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By using the constructed great divergence and the takeoffs shown in Figure 19 and 
by constructing more of such diagrams we could now create a unified growth 
theory describing properties of the distorted diagrams and insist that they represent 
mathematical properties of ( )f x , ( )g x  and ( )h x functions or the properties of 
other similar distributions. However, it would be naïve for us to expect that people 
familiar with mathematics would be impressed by our scholarly performance and 
by the mysteries we have created. It would be naïve to expect that they would 
accept our explanations of the claimed mathematical properties of hyperbolic-like 
distributions, and yet Galor expects that economists will accept his distorted 
representations of Maddison’s data and his explanations of economic growth based 
on such repeatedly distorted presentations of data reinforced by the numerous 
quotations of well-selected and isolated numbers, which are supposed to represent 
a reliable empirical confirmation of his theory.  
Like Galor, we could claim the existence of takeoffs from stagnation to growth for 
our mathematical, monotonically-increasing functions ( )f x , ( )g x  and ( )h x . We 
could try to explain these phantom takeoffs by some fanciful mechanisms, but such 
explanations would be unacceptable because the original functions increase 
monotonically. They are not characterised by sudden takeoffs. These takeoffs do 
not exist. We have created them by distorting the original functions.   
Like Galor, we could also claim the existence of the great divergence and try to 
explain it by some complicated mechanisms but again our claim and our 
explanations would be unacceptable because the original functions do not diverge. 
We have created the great divergence, which does not characterise the original 
functions but only their distorted representations. Like Galor, we could claim the 
existence of the “unresolved mysteries” (Galor, 2005a, p. 220) about mathematical 
functions but the only audience we could hope to impress would be people who are 
not familiar with mathematics. 
Conclusions based on the distorted representations of mathematical distributions
( )f x , ( )g x  and ( )h x can be obviously rejected. Likewise, conclusions based on 
Galor’s distorted representations of Maddison’s data can be and even should be 
rejected. Galor presents many curious and seemingly logical stories about 
economic growth but his stories are either repeatedly contradicted by data (Nielsen, 
2014, 2015a, 2016a, 2016b, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f, 2016g, 2016h) or have no 
convincing confirmation in data. They have to be accepted largely by faith. Stories 
of fiction can be also attractive, logical and convincing but they will remain stories 
of fiction. 
It would be incorrect to claim that the distorted diagrams presented in Figure 19 
represent the mathematical distributions ( )f x , ( )g x  and ( )h x . Likewise, it would 
be incorrect to claim that the distorted diagrams used repeatedly by Galor in his 
Unified Growth Theory and in his other publications represent Maddison’s data.  
It would be incorrect to claim that the distorted diagrams presented in Figure 19 
describe the mathematical functions ( )f x , ( )g x  and ( )h x . Likewise, it would be 
incorrect to claim that the distorted diagrams presented by Galor in his Unified 
Growth Theory and in his many other publications describe economic growth. 
They describe the world of fiction.  
As it is not expected that explanations of the properties of mathematical functions 
( )f x , ( )g x  and ( )h x based on their distorted representations shown in Figure 19 
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would be ever accepted by people familiar with mathematics, so also it can be 
hardly expected that explanations of economic growth based on such distorted 
presentations of data as used by Galor in his Unified Growth Theory and in his 
other publications can be accepted by the scientific community. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
We have analysed Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001, 2010) and we have 
demonstrated that the great divergence claimed by Galor (2005a, 2010) and shown 
in Figure 3 never happened. Various regions are now on different levels of 
development but their economic growth did not diverge into distinctly different 
trajectories as claimed by Galor (see Figure 3). Their income per capita increases 
along similar, approximately vertical trajectories.  
The disagreement between Galor’s claim and the data can be demonstrated using 
the early Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001), which Galor used in their habitually 
distorted presentations during the formulation of his Unified Growth Theory 
(Galor, 2005a, 2010). However, the disagreement between his claims and the data 
becomes even more pronounced if we display the latest data of Maddison (2010), 
which were available to Galor before the publication of his book (Galor, 2011).  
The data do not even have to be analysed mathematically to show that they 
contradict Galor’s claim of the existence of the great divergence but their 
mathematical analysis is helpful. Galor’s claims expressed in his Unified Growth 
Theory and in his other similar publications are based on his failure to adhere to the 
fundamental and indispensable principles of scientific investigation, which require 
that data should be rigorously analysed, that conclusions should not be based on 
impressions and that data should not be manipulated to support preconceived ideas. 
His theory and his claims and interpretations are scientifically unacceptable. 
“The mind-boggling phenomenon of the Great Divergence in income per capita 
across regions of the world in the past two centuries, that accompanied the take-off 
from an epoch of stagnation to a state of sustained economic growth, presents 
additional unresolved mysteries about the growth process” (Galor, 2005a, p. 220). 
It is interesting how a single sentence can contain so much misinformation. 
His mysteries have now been solved: he has created them by the manipulation of 
data.  
The great divergence never happened and neither did the takeoffs from Malthusian 
stagnation to growth (Nielsen, 2014, 2015a, 2016a, 2016b, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f, 
2016g, 2016h). Within the range of analysable data there was no stagnation and no 
claimed transition from stagnation to growth. Features described by Galor as 
takeoffs are not takeoffs but the natural continuations of monotonically-increasing 
hyperbolic distributions describing the growth of the GDP or population, or the 
natural continuations of monotonically-increasing linearly-modulated distributions 
describing the growth of the GDP/cap. Hyperbolic distributions or linearly-
modulated hyperbolic distributions are slow over a long time and fast over a short 
time but they do not change suddenly from slow to fast at any time. They increase 
monotonically all the time. 
Hyperbolic growth excludes the interpretations revolving around the concept of 
Malthusian stagnation and around takeoffs from stagnation to growth described 
usually as the escape from the Malthusian trap. The evidence contradicting such 
interpretations is overwhelming. It is remarkable that so many independent studies 
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are in such perfect agreement: Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001, 2010) and their 
analysis (Nielsen, 2014, 2015a, 2016a, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f, 2016g, 2016h); the 
estimates of the size of human population not only during the AD era but also 
during the BC era (e.g. Biraben, 1980; Clark,1968; Cook,1960; Durand, 1967, 
1974, 1977; Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; Livi-Bacci, 1997; McEvedy & Jones, 
1978; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 1994) and their 
analysis (e.g. Kremer, 1993; Nielsen, 2016b; Kapitza, 2006); the discovery made 
by von Foerster, Mora and Amiot (1960) and similar identifications of hyperbolic 
growth by Podlazov (2002), Shklovskii (1962, 2002) and von Hoerner (1975). 
According to Galor, the “differential timing of the take-off from stagnation to 
growth across countries, and the corresponding variations in the timing of the 
demographic transition, led to a great divergence in income per capita as well as 
population growth” (Galor, 2005a, p. 218). This is a good example how fiction can 
be created even in science. Non-existent takeoffs have been constructed by 
distorted presentations of data. These non-existent takeoffs were then used to 
explain the non-existent differential takeoffs, and now the same phantom takeoffs 
are used to explain the origin of the non-existent great divergence constructed by 
the manipulation of data.  
Galor wonders about “the underlying driving forces that triggered the recent 
transition between these regimes and the associated phenomenon of the Great 
Divergence in income per capita across countries” (Galor, 2005a, pp. 174, 219). 
While it is interesting to study reasons for differences in the level of economic 
growth of various regions and countries, there is no need not to wonder about the 
underlying driving forces of the great divergence because the great divergence 
never happened. 
Galor claims that “In the course of the ‘Great Divergence’ the ratio of GDP per 
capita between the richest region and the poorest region has widened considerably 
from a modest 3 : 1 ratio in 1820, to a 5 : 1 ratio in 1870, a 9 : 1 ratio in 1913,        
a 15 : 1 ratio in 1950, and a 18 : 1 ratio in 2001.” (Galor, 2005a, p. 174). All these 
ratios are probably correct but the conclusion is incorrect because there was no 
great divergence.  
This is a good example of being guided by impressions and of using them to draw 
hasty conclusions. Data have to be rigorously analysed. Using isolated numbers, as 
done repeatedly by Galor, is likely to lead to incorrect interpretations particularly if 
such use of isolated numbers is combined with the repeatedly distorted presentation 
of data, such as shown in Figures 1 and 3. Taking shortcuts and using them to draw 
hasty conclusions based usually on preconceived ideas and on wished-for 
interpretations does not represent the scientific process of investigation. The ratios 
listed by Galor do not prove the existence of the great divergence. We have already 
demonstrated that the great divergence never happened. The listed ratios represent 
nothing more than hyperbolic growth and different levels of development along 
virtually identical trajectories. 
Current economic growth in various regions and countries is at different levels of 
development. For countries characterised by high human development, income per 
capita can be as high as tens of thousands of dollars but for countries characterised 
by low human development it can be about one hundred times lower (Nielsen, 
2006). However, Maddison’s data show that economic growth in all regions, 
without exception, is developing along similar trajectories.  
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Galor’s interpretation of economic growth is potentially dangerous because it 
creates a false sense of security. He shows that gradients of the current economic-
growth trajectories are in general small and consequently the imminent economic 
crisis is unlikely (see Figure 3).  
However, data convey totally different information. Economic growth in all 
regions is now increasing rapidly along virtually vertical trajectories (see Figures 
4-17). They resemble the historical linearly-modulated trajectories, which increase 
to infinity at a fixed time. For such trajectories, economic crisis can be expected 
because the growth has to be supported by excessively large per annum increase in 
the GDP per capita. The created stress can be too high to be manageable over a 
long time. There is also a danger of reaching quickly natural limits to growth.  
Warning signs can be already seen in Eastern Europe, in countries of former USSR 
and in Africa (Figures 12, 13, 15). Their growth of income per capita suffered 
reversals but after a certain time it managed to recover and follow again the nearly 
vertical trajectories. Certain degree of instability can be also observed in Latin 
America (Figure 16). 
The preferred option would be to follow now gently-increasing trajectories but all 
regions, without exception, appear to be caught up in the general frenzy to increase 
rapidly their per capita economic growth. When they are temporarily left behind 
they soon resume their hazardous race. Current trajectories do not increase to 
infinity at a fixed time but they increase to infinity in a short time, which is hardly 
a consolation.  
All these important warning signs are not even noticed in the Unified Growth 
Theory. Unified Growth Theory suggests a prosperous future after an ages-long 
epoch of a hypothetical stagnation but the data show that the future of economic 
growth is approaching rapidly levels of unsustainability. It has been shown that the 
world economic growth follows unsustainable trajectory (Nielsen, 2015b). 
However, the analysis of Maddison’s data presented here suggests that this is a 
common danger shared by all regions. There is not a single region, whose 
economic growth diverged to a safer trajectory.        
The two opposite interpretations of economic growth have also essential impact on 
research activities. In order to explain Galor’s great divergence we would have to 
explain why there was a transition to distinctly different trajectories of economic 
growth. Such attempts would be a waste financial and human resources and a waste 
of time because the great divergence never happened. What we have to explain is 
why different regions follow virtually the same trajectories and why they follow 
such potentially-hazardous, fast-increasing trajectories. Why there is such a strong 
desire to increase the GDP per capita so quickly everywhere and how to control 
these dangerous tendencies.  
Galor claims that the “transitions from a Malthusian epoch to a state of sustained 
economic growth and the emergence of the Great Divergence have shaped the 
current growth process in the world economy” (Galor, 2005a, p. 221). They did not 
because there was no “emergence of the Great Divergence.” Galor describes 
phantom features he created by his manipulation of data. These phantom features 
could not have shaped the past growth and they do not shape the current growth 
because they did not and do not exist. Galor describes the world of fiction and 
events that never happened. He then uses these non-existing phenomena to weave 
his theory around them. 
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Transitions from the Malthusian epoch of stagnation to a state of sustained 
economic growth never happened because there was no stagnation. Economic 
growth was sustained in the past because it followed steadily-increasing hyperbolic 
trajectories.  Takeoffs, which are supposed to represent the claimed transitions 
from stagnation to growth, never happened (Nielsen, 2014, 2015a, 2016a, 2016b, 
2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f, 2016g, 2016h).  
Galor’s claims are based on distorted presentations of data and generally on 
repeatedly violating the fundamental principles of scientific investigation. They are 
based on impressions rather than on the rigorous scientific analysis of empirical 
evidence. 
Galor claims that the “unified growth theory sheds light on the perplexing 
phenomenon of the Great Divergence in income per capita across regions of the 
world in the past two centuries” (Galor, 2005a, p. 177). If it does, then his theory is 
a fiction because the perplexing phenomenon of the great divergence never 
happened. 
Why did we devote so much time for the discussion of Galor’s Unified Growth 
Theory (Nielsen, 2014, 2015a, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f, 2016g, 
2016h)? One of the obvious reasons is that the aim of any scientific investigation is 
to discover the truth. Science looks for correct interpretations but Galor’s theory is 
so obviously incorrect that it attracted immediate attention.  
However, there is also another important reason: Galor’s Unified Growth Theory is 
not only incorrect but also dangerously incorrect because it diverts attention from 
the urgent need to monitor, control and regulate the current economic growth. It 
would be unwise to accept his theory and his explanations because his incorrect 
explanations of the historical economic growth are linked strongly with the current 
economic growth, which affects our future. 
Galor claims that after a long epoch of stagnation we are now in the regime of 
sustained economic growth. His theory also strongly suggests that the current 
economic growth is not only sustained but also sustainable because in general it 
follows slowly-increasing trajectories (see Figure 3). The future appears to be safe 
and secure.  
However, precisely the same data, which he used during the formulation of his 
theory, show that the opposite is true. It was in the past that the economic growth 
was safe and secure but now it follows strongly hazardous trajectories. Recent 
analysis of the world economic growth also indicates that its future is insecure 
(Nielsen, 2015b), which is hardly surprising because our current combined 
ecological footprint is already significantly higher than the ecological capacity 
(WWF, 2010). 
Why did Galor manipulate data? Why did he repeatedly present distorted diagrams 
to support his preconceived ideas? Why did he quote isolated and well-chosen but 
otherwise meaningless numbers to support his arguments? Why did he create such 
an elaborate work of fiction?  
If we reject the suggestion that he did it all on purpose, then a possible explanation 
is that he did not know how to analyse data. However, this explanation is 
unconvincing because he appears to be familiar with mathematics. Anyone familiar 
with mathematics can quickly see the characteristic features of hyperbolic 
distributions in Maddion’s data and the analysis of hyperbolic distributions is 
trivially simple (Nielsen, 2014). Maybe he was not sure how scientific research 
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should be conducted but equally surprising is why his publications escaped the 
scrutiny of the peer-review system. 
The most plausible explanation is probably that he was blinded by prejudice. It is 
what psychologists describe as the cascade behaviour, information cascade, 
informational avalanche, illusion of truth, illusory truth, illusion of familiarity, 
running with the pack, following the crowd, herding behaviour, bandwagons and 
path depending choice (Anderson & Holt, 1997; Begg, Anas & Farinacci, 1992; 
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch, 1992, 1998; De Vany & Lee, 2008; De Vany 
& Walls, 1999; Easley & Kleinberg, 2010; Grebe, Schmid & Stiehler, 2008; 
Ondrias, 1999; Parks & Tooth, 2006; Ramsey, Raafat, Chater & Frith, 2009; 
Walden & Browne, 2003).  
In the demographic and economic research this phenomenon is demonstrated by 
the reluctance to accept the compelling contradicting evidence simply because 
many demographers or economists would not agree with the contradicting 
evidence. It is safer to follow the crowd and run with the pack. Tradition is stronger 
than science and only an outsider who has not been blinded by prejudice and who 
is not afraid of being rejected by the crowd might dare to show that the accepted 
doctrines are incorrect. He or she is then likely to be ridiculed and rejected but 
science is a self-correcting discipline so sooner or later such resistance to accept 
the overwhelming empirical evidence will have to be broken, but it would be better 
for science and scientists if the required change in the paradigm is accepted sooner 
rather than later. 
We now have a large body of data (Biraben, 1980; Clark,1968; Cook,1960; 
Durand, 1967, 1974, 1977; Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; Livi-Bacci, 1997; 
Maddison, 2001, 2010; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; 
Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 1994), which we can use to improve our understanding 
of the economic growth and of the growth of human population. The correct 
understanding of these two processes might have essential impact on our future. 
Mathematical analysis of data (Nielsen, 2014, 2015a, 2016a, 2016b, 2016d, 2016e, 
2016f, 2016g, 2016h) reveals many interesting features, which call for further 
investigation. The past economic growth and the growth of human population were 
hyperbolic. Within the range of analysable data, which for the growth of human 
population extends down to 10,000 BC, there was no Malthusian stagnation. 
Hyperbolic growth was slow but remarkably steady. There were no transitions 
from stagnation to growth because there was no stagnation. There was no escape 
from the Malthusian trap in the economic growth or in the growth of population 
because there was no trap. There were no takeoffs from stagnation to growth 
claimed by Galor (2005a, 2011). There was no differential timing of takeoffs, 
claimed also by Galor, because there were no takeoffs.  
We have demonstrated (Nielsen, 2016h) that there was no “sudden spurt in growth 
rates of output per capita” (Galor, 2005a, p. 220). Contrary to the similar claim 
made by Galor, there was also no sudden spurt in the growth rate of human 
population in the past 12,000 years (Nielsen, 2016b, 2016d). The “unresolved 
mysteries about the growth process” listed by Galor (2005a, p. 220) have now been 
solved. They were all created by him through the manipulation of data.  
Industrial Revolution had no impact on changing the trajectories of economic 
growth and of the growth of population. There was no population explosion. What 
is perceived as takeoffs or explosions are just the natural continuations of 
hyperbolic growth (Nielsen, 2014). There was also no “mind-boggling” and 
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“perplexing phenomenon of the Great Divergence in income per capita across 
regions of the world in the past two centuries” (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220).  
Recently, economic growth and the growth of human population started to be 
diverted to slower trajectories but these new trajectories continue to increase close 
to the historical hyperbolic trajectories. Analysis of data shows that not only the 
Unified Growth Theory but also the Demographic Transition Theory, which is 
based on similar assumptions, is repeatedly contradicted by empirical evidence 
(Nielsen, 2016c).  
All these features suggest further investigation to answer important question about 
economic growth and about the growth of human population. Why the economic 
growth and the growth of human population were hyperbolic. Why the hyperbolic 
growth was so remarkably stable over such a long time in the past. Why was it not 
affected by many random forces that were no doubt present? Why the economic 
growth and population growth trajectories were not affected by the Industrial 
Revolution. The only exception where there is a correlation between the Industrial 
Revolution and the economic growth and the growth of population is Africa, the 
poorest region. This boosting can be explained by the colonisation of Africa rather 
than by the beneficial effects of Industrial Revolution. What models should be used 
to explain the historical hyperbolic economic growth and the growth of human 
population? What are the common features that link these two processes? Why was 
the economic growth and the growth of human population diverted relatively 
recently to new, non-hyperbolic trajectories? Are these new trajectories likely to 
change again into the apparently preferred hyperbolic growth? How to prevent 
such an undesirable event? What should be done to make the growth of population 
and economic growth sustainable? Much work needs to be done but it would 
unwise and potentially dangerous to be guided by the Unified Growth Theory. 
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